This essay examines the contrasting conceptualizations of reason in the thought of John Henry Newman and Andrew Martin Fairbairn in their articles published in The Contemporary Review in 1885. This essay articulates both Fairbairn’s charge of philosophical scepticism against Newman as well as Newman’s defense of his position and concomitantly details Fairbairn’s and Newman’s competing notions of the efficacy of reason to provide reliable knowledge of God. The positions of Fairbairn and Newman remain two of the most important perspectives on (...) the role of reason in the acquisition of knowledge about God in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Christian theology. (shrink)

This book provides a much-needed, straightforward introduction to moral philosophy.

W. Matthews Grant's "Dual Sources Account" aims at explaining how God causes all creaturely actions while leaving them free in a robust libertarian sense. It includes an account of predestination that is supposed to allow for the possibility that some created persons ultimately spend eternity in hell. I argue here that the resources Grant provides for understanding why God might permit created persons to end up in hell are, for two different reasons, insufficient. I then provide possible solutions to these (...) two problems, compatible with Grant's account overall, that help show why God might allow hell. (shrink)

Enth.: Dugoald Stewart's account of Adam Smith / ed. by I.S. Ross.

Christian philosophers have always been interested in clarifying the relationship between God and ethics. The theories presented on this topic can be divided into two kinds: “divine command” and “other.” In this paper I evaluate two interesting but ultimately incompatible versions of the “other” variety: one by George Mavrodes and one by Søren Kierkegaard. In the course of my analysis I argue that anyone who reads Kierkegaard’s Works of Love as presenting a divine command theory is mistaken.

This book provides a much-needed, straightforward introduction to moral philosophy. It will particularly benefit students following courses containing an ethics module, including philosophy from AS level onwards, religious studies, law and medicine, but it has also been written for any reader puzzled by moral disputes and dilemmas. Written in an easy and approachable style and packed with lively examples from everyday life, the first section of the book clearly explains and assesses the arguments for and against the rival moral theories (...) of utilitarianism, Kantianism, Divine Command Theory and virtue ethics. The second section develops this by analysing the conflicting advice each moral theory gives regarding four controversial areas of life, namely euthanasia, abortion, animal rights and the environment. The final section concludes with an account of the vital debate concerning whether the difference between right and wrong is an objective fact discovered by us, like gravity, or is instead a human creation and invented by us, like tax laws. Throughout the book moral arguments are broken down into their component parts and explained in clear and simple stages so that readers not previously familiar with philosophical reasoning are aware at all times of where they are in the debate, and where the strengths and weaknesses lie in each position. As such, it is an ideal introduction to critical thinking as well as to moral philosophy. (shrink)

Research involving and impacting Indigenous Peoples is often of little or no benefit to the communities involved and, in many cases, causes harm. Ensuring that Indigenous research is not only ethical but also of benefit to the communities involved is a long-standing problem that requires fundamental changes in higher education. To address this necessity for change, the authors of this paper, with the help of graduate and Indigenous community research assistants, undertook community consultation across their university to identify the local (...) and national ethical needs of Indigenous researchers, communities, and Elders. This paper provides an overview of the consultation process, the themes that emerged from the consultations, and a model of the Wholistic Indigenous Research Framework that emerged. (shrink)

This paper examines a difficulty for various forms of truth pluralism, known in the literature as the problem of ‘mixed atomics’. It is argued that two prominent attempts to respond to the difficulty—those of Jeremy Wyatt and Gila Sher—fail. In their place, an alternative is offered based on parts of Crispin Wright’s Truth and Objectivity programme. It is argued that the Wrightian approach works because it substitutes traditional conceptions of truth-relevant properties, for example correspondence and coherence, for criteria of objectivity (...) pertaining to discursive practices. This allows us to give expression to the nuanced way in which the pluralist wants to treat mixed atomics. (shrink)

This study examines the influence of socialization on work-related norms (WORKNORM).We tested the hypothesis that organizational (ORGSOC) and professional socialization (PROFSOC) are antecedent influences on WORKNORM, employing a sample of 339 marketing practitioners. The results of covariance structural analysis indicate that ORGSOC and PROFSOC and WORKNORM are discriminant constructs within the tested model. The study also reveals that the influence of ORGSOC on WORKNORM is stronger than the influence of PROFSOC on these same norms.Because this social learning occurs in work-related (...) activities, in organizations, and in professional life, it is important that managers appreciate that these three separate domains influence decision making under ethical conditions. The limitations of the study and future research directions are discussed. (shrink)

According to Charles Travis our language is occasion-sensitive. The truth- conditions of all our sentences, and their correctness-conditions more generally, vary depending on the occasions on which they are used. This is part of a broader view of language as unshadowed. This paper develops objections Travis has made from this viewpoint against Michael Dummett’s anti-realism. It aims to show that the arguments are suggestive but inconclusive. For all it shows unshadowed anti-realism is a possibility.

Professor Hannay’s biography on the famous Danish thinker is a welcome addition to those previously made available in English. Ever since Walter Lowrie’s monumental Kierkegaard was published several decades ago, those who read Søren Kierkegaard in English have had to sift through the historical details for themselves in order to distinguish among fact, fiction, and legend. Whereas the ghost of Lowrie’s Kierkegaard is virtually dead and gone, the Kierkegaard who took its place had a less sharply defined personality. This changes, (...) however, with Hannay’s new book. Hannay offers not a few of his own insights as he recreates the mind and personality of Kierkegaard, some of which are as interesting as they are speculative, but he offers the skeptical reader a host of sources by which to check his interpretation. (shrink)

Insulin is stored within the pancreas in an inactive Zn2+‐bound hexameric form prior to release. Similarly, clinical insulins contain Zn2+ and form multimeric complexes. Upon release from the pancreas or upon injection, insulin only becomes active once Zn2+ disengages from the complex. In plasma and other extracellular fluids, the majority of Zn2+ is bound to human serum albumin (HSA), which plays a vital role in controlling insulin pharmacodynamics by enabling removal of Zn2+. The Zn2+‐binding properties of HSA are attenuated by (...) non‐esterified fatty acids (NEFAs) also transported by HSA. Elevated NEFA concentrations are associated with obesity and type 2 diabetes. Here we present the hypothesis that higher NEFA levels in obese and/or diabetic individuals may contribute to insulin resistance and affect therapeutic insulin dose‐response profiles, through modulation of HSA/Zn2+ dynamics. We envisage this novel concept to have important implications for personalized treatments and management of diabetes‐related conditions in the future. (shrink)

The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense originated as a protest against the philosophy of the greatest Scottish philosopher. Hume's sceptical conclusions did not excite as much opposition as might have been expected. But in Scotland especially there was a good deal of spoken criticism which was never written; and some who would have liked to denounce Hume's doctrines in print were restrained by the salutary reflection that if they were challenged to give reasons for their criticism they would find it (...) uncommonly difficult to do so. Hume's scepticism was disliked, but it was difficult to see how it could be adequately met. At this point Thomas Reid stepped into the field. He was the only man of his time who really understood the genesis of Hume's scepticism and succeeded in locating its sources. At first sight it would seem that this discovery required no peculiar perspicuity. It would seem that nobody could help seeing that Hume's sceptical conclusions were based on Locke's premises, and that Hume could never be successfully opposed by any critic who accepted Locke's assumptions. But this is precisely one of those obvious things that is noticed by nobody. And in fact Reid was the first man to see it clearly. It thus became his duty to question the assumptions on which all his own early thought had been based. The result of this reflection was the conclusion that, since the "ideal theory" of Locke and Berkeley logically led to Hume's scepticism, and since scepticism was intolerable, that theory would have to be amended, or, if necessary, abandoned. This volume contains works by Thomas Reid, Adam Ferguson, James Beattie, and Dugald Stewart. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Considering AnimalsKheel's Nature Ethics and Animal Debates in EcofeminismNoël Sturgeon (bio)How we treat the use of animals by humans for sport, experimentation or food has been controversial within ecofeminism. While it is fair to say that all ecofeminists agree that factory farming and cruel treatment of animals is morally wrong, universal arguments for vegetarianism or veganism have been, if one forgives the metaphor, a bone of contention. Attached to (...) these disagreements are important philosophical and political debates about ecological holism, individualistic frameworks, cultural difference, social privilege and ethics of care, which are consequential above and beyond evaluating our treatment of animals. Thus, ecofeminist discussions of animal issues have been formative for environmental ethics and politics, while remaining a delicate matter when disagreement occurs among a relatively small group of thinkers, activists and scholars who tend towards solidarity.Val Plumwood, the important Australian philosopher whose work and life are celebrated in this volume, was especially cognizant of all of this. In April 1998, Plumwood presented an early version of what became two articles on animal/human relationships (Plumwood 1999, 2000) at the Ecofeminist Perspectives Conference at the University of Montana. [End Page 153] The presentation, which occurred early in the conference, was, typical of Plumwood, straightforwardly contentious, a bold challenge to the position of some ecofeminists at the time that veganism was the only morally acceptable diet. In it, she suggested that what she called "ontological veganism" was a position that was both culturally ethnocentric and dualistic, two accusations guaranteed to deeply disturb this particular audience. The conference, organized by Deborah Slicer (whose 1996 article, "Your Daughter or Your Dog?" argued against animal experimentation), was also attended by Marti Kheel (who, along with Carol Adams, was an early proponent of "ontological veganism"). Present also were thinkers with more nuanced positions on the issue, such as Lori Gruen, Greta Gaard, and Karen Warren. Thus, Plumwood's provocation felt personal, and produced lively debate at the conference, and an even livelier argument on email afterwards.1 Stung by being portrayed as racist, several ecofeminists reacted with anger at Plumwood, with the result that she publicly rejected the label "ecofeminist," and from then until her untimely death, preferred the category "critical feminist eco-socialism" to describe her framework.Despite the hurt feelings, this debate (and Plumwood's subsequent articles and sections in her 2002 book, Environmental Culture: The Ecological Crisis of Reason), moved ecofeminist treatment of the issues of animals and morally sound eating practices considerably forward. Plumwood argued that to avoid the dualism of human/nature, humans should recognize themselves as prey as well as predator, an approach she brilliantly portrayed in her article on the experience of surviving a crocodile attack. (Plumwood 1995) In her view, any position that eliminated the possibility of using some animals as food necessarily relied upon a rights-based, individualistic approach that retained the status of some living beings as excluded from moral consideration. Yet, Plumwood argued, from a contextualized moral position, which respected both continuity and difference between different groups of living beings, one could make ethical claims about the moral problems of eating animals. She was particularly interested, both philosophically and from a politically strategic perspective, in arguing against the practice of factory farming. Karen Warren, in her book Ecofeminist Philosophy (2000), also followed and expanded Plumwood's discussion by emphasizing the advantages of a contextualized ethic of care in the treatment of animals as food, arguing (and as such agreeing with Plumwood's conference presentation), that it was ethnocentric [End Page 154] to insist on universal standards in evaluating whether some cultural groups, such as the Inuit, could morally refrain from eating animals. Greta Gaard's thoughtful article on the indigenous Makah whale hunt (2001) took on the charge of ethnocentrism directly, as in some ways an answer to Plumwood's provocation.Given this background, it is interesting to read Marti Kheel's important new book and see how her promotion of veganism as a moral position is articulated. A longtime feminist, vegan, and animal advocate, Kheel is a co-founder of the activist group Feminists for Animal Rights, and the author of an important early critique of deep... (shrink)

A scholarly edition of a work by Adam Smith. The edition presents an authoritative text, together with an introduction, commentary notes, and scholarly apparatus.

In part one of our analysis of the unpublished lecture materials of thomas reid relating to adam smith, The authors touched on issues of provenance, Of manuscript description and arrangement, As well as of substance concerning reid's actual comments on smith. We have now provided as authentic a reproduction as possible of the relevant manuscript materials in the birkwood collection, Aberdeen, Arguing that there is a perceptible and studied order to reid's forceful objections.

The second edition of Andrew Skinner's essays has been updated to take account of his latest thinking on Adam Smith's system of social and moral science and his experience of teaching Smith to a student audience. The material from the first edition has been extensively rewritten in the light of recent scholarship, and four new essays have been included. Each essay can be read as a self-contained unit, supported by a full bibliography and notes; the book as a whole expounds (...) a single coherent argument which demonstrates how Smith's works are inter-related. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Evil and Contemporary Philosophical Orthodoxy Defense versus Theodicy The Free Will Defense Life's Purpose and Perfect Happiness Developing a Theodicy Adams and Horrendous Evil Plantinga's “ O Felix Culpa ” Theodicy Beasts and the Problem of Evil References.

This is a very important contribution to the slowly emerging literature on psychoanalysis and time. By examining the influences on Freud's thinking about time and the development of what were his mostly implicit ideas about temporality, Kelly Noel-Smith offers a lively and impeccably scholarly new way of understanding the background to current developments in psychoanalytic theory and practice." - Professor Stephen Frosh, Birkbeck, University of London, UK. "Dr Noel-Smith displays deep knowledge of Freud's oeuvre, the relevant Ancient Greek (...) sources that Freud drew upon, and modern philosophical thought. Her expertise is synthesized into a well-organized inquiry into what Freud thought about time. I learned a huge amount from reading this clear, well-informed and profound exposition." - Professor Charles Stewart, University College London, UK. Time and timelessness are fundamental principles of psychoanalysis yet Freud does not present a consolidated theory of temporality. In this book Kelly Noel-Smith pieces together Freud's scattered 'hints' and 'suspicions' about time and its negative, timelessness. She traces a careful temporal trail through Freud's published works and his daunting Nachlass, and provides a compelling reason as to why Freud kept his remarkable thoughts about time to himself. Kelly Noel-Smith combines a career in law with an academic interest in psychoanalysis and philosophy. (shrink)

This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science's classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind. _Enaction_, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in _The Embodied Mind_, breaks from CTM's formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied (...) action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. _Enaction_ offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: the relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science. Contributors: Renaud Barbaras, Didier Bottineau, Giovanna Colombetti, Diego Cosmelli, Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Andreas K. Engel, Olivier Gapenne, Véronique Havelange, Edwin Hutchins, Michel Le Van Quyen, Rafael E. Núñez, Marieke Rohde, Benny Shanon, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Adam Sheya, Linda B. Smith, John Stewart, Evan Thompson. (shrink)

Impressions of Hume consists of an editorial Introduction and twelve original essays, most of which were earlier presented at the “Hume Studies in Britain” interdisciplinary workshops held in Cambridge, Edinburgh, and Oxford. This collection is a valuable one, especially for those interested in the intellectual contexts of Hume’s metaphysics and ethics. It might be shelved alongside—in parts it seems an extension of—M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright’s edited collection from 1994, Hume and Hume’s Connexions. Indeed, Impressions of Hume (...) begins with M. A. Stewart’s 47-page article, “The Intellectual Development of Hume, 1711–1752,” which covers Hume’s life of reading in detail from the curriculum at the College of Edinburgh through his bookish interests of 1725–1729, and then leaps ahead, in more summary fashion, to Hume’s professional interests in the decade after completing the Treatise, including his ongoing concern to distance himself from that work, culminating in the 1775 “Advertisement” and 1776 “My Own Life.” Rich in archival research and in full command of Hume’s intellectual and social milieus, Stewart’s article whets the appetite for the full-blown biography of which this seems a partial draft. According to this volume’s “Notes on Contributors,” however, Hume’s intellectual biography is now in the hands of James A. Harris, whose contribution here, “Hume’s Use of the Rhetoric of Calvinism,” marks him as a worthy successor to Stewart and the other scholars—Harris cites Roger Emerson and James Moore—who have set the understanding of Hume’s life on a whole new footing since E. C. Mossner’s second edition of The Life of David Hume. Harris argues that Hume used fideistic pronouncements, especially in the first Enquiry, to align himself strategically with the Calvinist opponents of the neo-Stoic moderates in church and university, including Hutcheson, who blocked Hume from securing the Edinburgh moral philosophy chair in 1745. Hume’s intention, according to Harris, “was to discredit by whatever means possible the revolution in moral philosophy being engineered by Hutcheson, and so to imply a need for a return to the time when moral philosophy was one thing, and the teaching of natural religion another”. (shrink)

Impressions of Hume consists of an editorial Introduction and twelve original essays, most of which were earlier presented at the “Hume Studies in Britain” interdisciplinary workshops held in Cambridge, Edinburgh, and Oxford. This collection is a valuable one, especially for those interested in the intellectual contexts of Hume’s metaphysics and ethics. It might be shelved alongside—in parts it seems an extension of—M. A. Stewart and John P. Wright’s edited collection from 1994, Hume and Hume’s Connexions. Indeed, Impressions of Hume (...) begins with M. A. Stewart’s 47-page article, “The Intellectual Development of Hume, 1711–1752,” which covers Hume’s life of reading in detail from the curriculum at the College of Edinburgh through his bookish interests of 1725–1729, and then leaps ahead, in more summary fashion, to Hume’s professional interests in the decade after completing the Treatise, including his ongoing concern to distance himself from that work, culminating in the 1775 “Advertisement” and 1776 “My Own Life.” Rich in archival research and in full command of Hume’s intellectual and social milieus, Stewart’s article whets the appetite for the full-blown biography of which this seems a partial draft. According to this volume’s “Notes on Contributors,” however, Hume’s intellectual biography is now in the hands of James A. Harris, whose contribution here, “Hume’s Use of the Rhetoric of Calvinism,” marks him as a worthy successor to Stewart and the other scholars—Harris cites Roger Emerson and James Moore—who have set the understanding of Hume’s life on a whole new footing since E. C. Mossner’s second edition of The Life of David Hume. Harris argues that Hume used fideistic pronouncements, especially in the first Enquiry, to align himself strategically with the Calvinist opponents of the neo-Stoic moderates in church and university, including Hutcheson, who blocked Hume from securing the Edinburgh moral philosophy chair in 1745. Hume’s intention, according to Harris, “was to discredit by whatever means possible the revolution in moral philosophy being engineered by Hutcheson, and so to imply a need for a return to the time when moral philosophy was one thing, and the teaching of natural religion another”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scott Joplin and the Quest for IdentityEarl Stewart and Jane DuranIn his innovative work I Wanna Be Me: Rock Music and the Politics of Identity, Ted Gracyk does much to dismantle notions of cultural authenticity and theft as they are currently articulated by some critics. Explaining that such concepts are less monolithic than some have claimed, Gracyk writes:While popular musicians often "pick up" the music of other cultures, (...) such practices are culturally, politically, and morally complex. In discussing such issues, I hope to show that they are even more complex than is typically thought. Here, I borrow an insight from Michelle Moody-Adams, who argues that prevailing positions in social and cultural anthropology assume that cultures are internally integrated wholes and that each culture is fundamentally a set of self-contained and discrete practices and beliefs. The same assumptions infest discussions of appropriation in cultural studies, folk-lore studies, and ethnomusicology. But these assumptions are highly questionable.1Gracyk's overall point is that what has frequently been simplified as "theft" or "inauthentic" is not susceptible to such easy formulation; indeed, Gracyk contends there is scarcely such a thing as a pure musical tradition.Gracyk's sophisticated argument is one, however, that itself admits of gradations and emendations. While it is no doubt accurate that there is very little that might count as artistically or culturally pure (hence, very little that can justifiably be claimed to have been stolen), some work is much more evocative of a cultural point of view than other efforts, and some work is much more centrally located within a given culture and its traditions than other musical work. In this article we shall make the twofold argument that much of the work of Scott Joplin is located in a tradition that is manifestly African derived, and that the composition of such work had, as one of its motivators, the desire to make a cultural statement. Thus, more so than some of Gracyk's exemplars, Joplin's work is strongly culturally attached, and its attachment needs to be duly noted.IThe origins of Joplin's work speak to the concerns of the nineteenth century and of the period immediately subsequent to emancipation. Most of [End Page 94] the black leadership of the time was united in its belief that a nationalist art would serve in the reconstruction of the image of African Americans. During the latter part of the nineteenth century many of these leaders saw the spiritual as the ideal folkloric basis for a serious black artistic expression. In music this notion was given strong support as a result of a concurrent interest on the part of European composers in African American music—an interest fed by the aesthetic of romanticism, which encouraged artistic investment in the strange, unusual, primitive, and exotic.Most classically trained African American composers attempted to comply with the vision of these black leaders by constructing a more or less European-style music tinctured with African American folk elements. The result would be a set of works that to this day has failed to be adopted by the African American community at large.Scott Joplin tried a different approach. He sought to create an African American musical expression that would be predicated upon an African American vernacular style—ragtime. Joplin essentialized his music in many ways. First, by choosing ragtime as a stylistic paradigm he assured the preservation of black rhythm. Second, to promote continuity and coherence he often employed rhythmic relationships between contrasting sections. Third, he frequently employed African American folk idioms like pentatonicism and call-and-response (antiphony) as interregnal devices in the structure of his melodies. Fourth, to assure an intrastructural linkage with the African American vernacular music of his day, he frequently used phrase structures that were consistent with those employed in folk music, particularly the black spiritual, for example, aaab. In his opera, Treemonisha, he based his libretto largely on black dialect, thus linking it with black literary tradition. These are but a few of the devices Joplin employed to assure a strong cultural essentialism to his music. As a result, Joplin has been acknowledged as one of the great icons of... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:69 WILLIAM ROBERTSON AND DAVID HUME: THREE LETTERS The relationship between David Hume and his fellow Scottish historian William Robertson has always seemed one-sided. Despite the existence of fifteen letters to Robertson in the standard volumes of Hume's correspondence,1 Hume scholars have long had reason to regret the lack of a single extant letter from Robertson to Hume. None are to be found, for example, where one would most (...) expect them to be — in the Royal Society of Edinburgh, alongside the letters to Hume from various other Moderate clergymen and literati in Robertson's circle, such as Hugh Blair and Adam Ferguson. Fortunately, however, two of Robertson's letters to Hume (numbered II and III below) have now turned up where one would not expect them to be — among Robertson's own correspondence in the Robertson2 Macdonald Papers, National Library of Scotland. They are not mere drafts, such as one is accustomed to find among an author's private papers; rather, they are autograph signed letters that appear to have actually been posted. How and when they found their way back to Robertson's personal papers, and what became of the rest of Robertson's letters to Hume, are questions open to speculation. For the moment we are grateful for the letters we now have, neither of which is known to have been published before in whole or in part. Nor has Hume been identified before as the recipient of either of these letters, though internal evidence makes it clear that he was. Both letters date from the late 1760s, when Hume was living in London and Robertson was at the peak of his multi-faceted career in Edinburgh as university principal, parish minister, ecclesiastical leader, and man of letters. The first of them, dated 27 March 1767, was sent to Hume in his capacity as under- 70 secretary of state in the Northern Department (an office he held from February 1767 to January 1768). It is plainly a reply to a letter of 19 March, in which Hume had discussed three topics to which Robertson was 5 responding: Robertson's efforts to secure a military chaplaincy for a certain Scottish minister (evidently named Brodie); Conway's role in the famous dispute between Hume and Rousseau; and the public response to Adam Ferguson's newly published Essay on the History of Civil Society. In addition Robertson addresses a matter that Hume had apparently broached with him at some earlier time: the attempt to find a suitable Scottish church to which Hume might obtain a crown presentation for his nephews' tutor, the Rev. Christopher Tait. The letter concludes on a note of admiration that is characteristic not only of Robertson but of most of Hume's other "Protestant Pastors" in Scotland. The second letter to Hume, dated 31 January 1769, is chiefly concerned with the forthcoming publication of Robertson's History of Charles V and the French translation of it by J.-B.-A. Suard — subjects that had been treated in two letters from Hume to 7 Robertson of autumn 1768. It also contains a strong recommendation for a bright young Scottish writer (in both the legal and literary senses of that term) who would one day become Robertson's most vitriolic critic: Gilbert Stuart. On the personal side, there is encouragement for the now unemployed Hume to return to Edinburgh, as he was then threatening to do, after his "great glut of society" at Paris and London, and there are allusions in the closing paragraph to Hume's part in introducing his friend to polite society when Robertson had visited London to arrange the publication of Charles V in the spring of 1768. 71 To these two letters from Robertson we have prefixed a third from earlier in the same decade, one Q not actually addressed to Hume but largely about him. Robertson wrote it to their common friend Gilbert Elliot (later Sir Gilbert Elliot) on 8 March 1762, two days before the Town Council elected Robertson principal of Edinburgh University. The first paragraph deals with the principalship and relates to Hume only indirectly, as we point out in a footnote. The second paragraph, however, contains interesting... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:69 WILLIAM ROBERTSON AND DAVID HUME: THREE LETTERS The relationship between David Hume and his fellow Scottish historian William Robertson has always seemed one-sided. Despite the existence of fifteen letters to Robertson in the standard volumes of Hume's correspondence,1 Hume scholars have long had reason to regret the lack of a single extant letter from Robertson to Hume. None are to be found, for example, where one would most (...) expect them to be — in the Royal Society of Edinburgh, alongside the letters to Hume from various other Moderate clergymen and literati in Robertson's circle, such as Hugh Blair and Adam Ferguson. Fortunately, however, two of Robertson's letters to Hume (numbered II and III below) have now turned up where one would not expect them to be — among Robertson's own correspondence in the Robertson2 Macdonald Papers, National Library of Scotland. They are not mere drafts, such as one is accustomed to find among an author's private papers; rather, they are autograph signed letters that appear to have actually been posted. How and when they found their way back to Robertson's personal papers, and what became of the rest of Robertson's letters to Hume, are questions open to speculation. For the moment we are grateful for the letters we now have, neither of which is known to have been published before in whole or in part. Nor has Hume been identified before as the recipient of either of these letters, though internal evidence makes it clear that he was. Both letters date from the late 1760s, when Hume was living in London and Robertson was at the peak of his multi-faceted career in Edinburgh as university principal, parish minister, ecclesiastical leader, and man of letters. The first of them, dated 27 March 1767, was sent to Hume in his capacity as under- 70 secretary of state in the Northern Department (an office he held from February 1767 to January 1768). It is plainly a reply to a letter of 19 March, in which Hume had discussed three topics to which Robertson was 5 responding: Robertson's efforts to secure a military chaplaincy for a certain Scottish minister (evidently named Brodie); Conway's role in the famous dispute between Hume and Rousseau; and the public response to Adam Ferguson's newly published Essay on the History of Civil Society. In addition Robertson addresses a matter that Hume had apparently broached with him at some earlier time: the attempt to find a suitable Scottish church to which Hume might obtain a crown presentation for his nephews' tutor, the Rev. Christopher Tait. The letter concludes on a note of admiration that is characteristic not only of Robertson but of most of Hume's other "Protestant Pastors" in Scotland. The second letter to Hume, dated 31 January 1769, is chiefly concerned with the forthcoming publication of Robertson's History of Charles V and the French translation of it by J.-B.-A. Suard — subjects that had been treated in two letters from Hume to 7 Robertson of autumn 1768. It also contains a strong recommendation for a bright young Scottish writer (in both the legal and literary senses of that term) who would one day become Robertson's most vitriolic critic: Gilbert Stuart. On the personal side, there is encouragement for the now unemployed Hume to return to Edinburgh, as he was then threatening to do, after his "great glut of society" at Paris and London, and there are allusions in the closing paragraph to Hume's part in introducing his friend to polite society when Robertson had visited London to arrange the publication of Charles V in the spring of 1768. 71 To these two letters from Robertson we have prefixed a third from earlier in the same decade, one Q not actually addressed to Hume but largely about him. Robertson wrote it to their common friend Gilbert Elliot (later Sir Gilbert Elliot) on 8 March 1762, two days before the Town Council elected Robertson principal of Edinburgh University. The first paragraph deals with the principalship and relates to Hume only indirectly, as we point out in a footnote. The second paragraph, however, contains interesting... (shrink)